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Abstract 
 
We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in 
Japan. We construct a new dataset on founding families, which includes data on 
founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior 
managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his 
descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed 
firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a 
premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of 
family firms both owned and managed by the founder’s descendants is inferior to that of 
nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the 
founder’s descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Family firms are unique among publicly traded firms. Many founding families hold 
both a large stake of equity and senior management positions in their firms. In other 
words, ownership and control is not separated in many family firms. Another 
characteristic of family firms is succession of control of the business to the founder’s 
descendant. Succession to one’s descendant is controversial. Burkart et al. (2003) and 
Perez-Gonzalez (2006) suggest that unrelated senior managers are superior. To the 
contrary, Laband and Lentz (1986) and Lentz and Laband (1990) suggest the 
importance of intangible transfers between generations. Thus, a family firm is different 
from the well-known “Berle and Means firm”, where ownership is dispersed among 
small shareholders, but control is concentrated in the hands of professional managers. 
Over the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on 
how to mitigate agency costs between managers and shareholders in the “Berle and 
Means firm”. In contrast, only a few studies have been conducted so far on family firms, 
especially in developed countries. However, it is important to study family firms 
because they are common among public firms not only in developing countries, but also 
in developed countries (La Porta et al., 1999). Faccio and Lang (2002) find that 44% of 
firms in Western Europe are controlled by families. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show 
that founding families are present in one-third of S&P 500 firms in the US. 
Several recent studies have found a relationship between family firms and firm 
performance across countries. However, the results are mixed. It is important to 
generate stylized facts on family firm from different countries, because various 
characteristics of the country, for example, the legal system, affect family firms 
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Thus, we may be able to understand the differences by 
generating international evidence on family firms. 
In this paper, we aim to clarify the relationship between family firm and firm 
performance in Japan by classifying the family firms based on the characteristics of the 
management and ownership. Family firms are not uniform, especially after the founder 
retires, when a variety of structures may come into play. For example, after founder 
retired, his descendant can choose to run the business or to hire the professional 
nonfamily manager. In addition, the founding family could choose between making a 
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seasoned equity offering (SEO) or not. SEO may boost expansion of the business, but 
lower the ratio of family ownership and undermine the ascendance of the founding 
family. In order to take the characteristics of family firms into account, we classify 
family firms by ownership, management, and number of generations of the founding 
family, and estimate the relationship between the various categories of family firms and 
firm value. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-sample study to examine 
the relationship between family firms and firm performance in Japan. 
Using data for 1,818 publicly traded firms in Japan from 1990 to 1998, we construct 
a unique dataset for founding families that includes founding family ownership, family 
management, and the generation of family senior managers. We find that founding 
families are a prevalent and important class of shareholders and senior managers in 
Japan. In our sample, 738 firms (40% of all listed firms) have a shareholder related to 
the founding family among the twenty largest shareholders. In 550 firms (30%), the 
founding family is the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity. In 461 firms (25%), the 
largest shareholder is the founding family. In 659 firms (36%), the senior manager 
(president or chairman) is the founder or his descendant. In 423 firms (23%), the largest 
shareholder is the founding family and the senior manager is from the founding family. 
In addition, we find that there are many family firms where ownership and management 
are separated in Japanese public firms. When founders are still active, the founding 
family is the largest shareholder in 80% of firms. However, after succession of the 
management position to a founder’s descendant, the founding family is the largest 
shareholder in about 55% of firms. 
The empirical results indicate that the family firms slightly outperform nonfamily 
firms in Japan. However, the family firm premium mainly results from the active 
founders. After retirement of founders, the results are mixed. We find that the 
performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder’s descendants is 
inferior to that of nonfamily firms, but the performance of family firms owned or 
managed by the founder’s descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. We also 
find that investors devalue family firms managed by descendants by marriage compared 
with family firms managed by blood descendants.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review previous 
studies, and present our arguments on family firms. In section 3, we describe our data 
and provide summary statistics. We present the empirical results in section 4. Section 5 
explores the robustness of the results, and section 6 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. The Family Firm 
2-1. Previous Studies 
Recently, the costs and benefits of family firms where have been discussed widely, 
based on the classic owner-manager agency problem (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and the agency problem between large and small shareholders. In 
many family firms, the founding families hold a large equity stake and also occupy 
senior management positions. The potential benefit of managers having large ownership 
stakes is that it provides them with having strong financial incentives to improve firm 
performance. In addition, Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that high levels of managers’ 
ownership help signal firm’s quality when information asymmetries exist between 
managers and outside shareholders.2 
The potential cost of large concentrated shareholders is that they take actions that 
pursue private benefits at the expense of other shareholders and firm performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Several papers show that founding families seek private 
benefits from the management of their family firms. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) and 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) show that nepotism within a family firm hurts firm 
performance. Perez-Gozalez (2006) examines 500 US firms and finds that when the 
current family CEO announces his/her resignation, the share price rises sharply if the 
incoming CEO is an external manager and fell if it is another family manager. 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) find that in Denmark, family succession lowers firm 
performance. Bertrand et al. (2005) show that in Thailand, a wider involvement of 
family members in family firms lowers firm performance. 
These private benefits of control are strongly affected by the level of legal protection 
given to minority shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Burkart et al. (2003) model 
                                                 
2 Bertrand and Schoar (2006) discuss family firms from a broad perspective. 
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the control succession decisions of family firms and argue that founding families choose 
to preserve control within the family if the level of protection given to minority 
shareholders is weak. Consistent with this prediction, Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio 
and Lang (2002) show that a family firm is the dominant form of ownership structure in 
Asia and continental Europe, where the protection of minority shareholders is, in 
general, weak. 
Several studies find a relationship between family firms and firm performance. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the relationship between family firms and firm 
performance in the US. They find that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms 
and conclude that family firms have an effective organizational structure. Moreover, 
McConnaughy et al. (1998) find that in the US, family firms are also more efficient and 
valuable than nonfamily firms. Maury (2006) shows that in Western Europe, family 
firms managed by the founding family are more profitable than nonfamily firms. In 
contrast, Claessens et al. (2002) show that in Southeast Asian countries, family firms 
underperform relative to nonfamily firms. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find that in 
Sweden, the value of family firms is largely discounted. Barth et al. (2004) show that in 
Norway, family firms owned and managed by the founding family are less productive 
than nonfamily firms. 
More recent studies indicate the importance of the generation of the family 
management and family structure in family firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine 
the relationship between family firms and Tobin’s q in the US. They conclude that 
founder-CEO firms outperform nonfamily firms however, when descendants serve as 
CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Morck et al. (2000) find that in Canada, family firms 
controlled by an heir exhibit poor financial performance. Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) find that in France, Germany, the UK, and the US, poor management practices 
are more prevalent in family firms managed by a founder’s descendant. A notable 
exception is the research by Sraer and Thesmar (2007), who, in France, find a premium 
for family firms, even if they are managed by descendants of founders.  
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2-2. Definition of Family Firm 
Family firms are firms where the founding family has an influence over firm policy, 
corporate strategy, personnel issues, and so on, through ownership and participation in 
management. We define family firms as those in which the founder or his descendant is 
a president or chairman and/or the founding family is the largest shareholder in the 
firm.3 This definition is slightly different from that used in previous studies in the US. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) define family firms as firms 
where the founder or a member of the founding family is an officer, a director, or the 
owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity.4 In Japan, Prowse (1992) shows that most of 
firms have a blockholder like a main bank, mochiai, or keiretsu. Therefore, if we apply 
the definition of previous studies, many founding families in Japan do not exert 
influence over the firm as a shareholder, even if they have a stake exceeding 5% in the 
firm. In terms of management, there are few outside directors and a strict hierarchy 
within boards in Japanese firms. This structure is needed to assume power as president 
or chairman for controlling the firm. 
 
2-3. Family Firm Type 
In this paper, we classify the family firms based on the characteristics of the 
management and ownership in order to clarify the relationship between family firm and 
firm performance. The founding family could affect firm performance in various ways. 
For example, after the founder’s retirement, the founder’s descendant can choose to run 
the business and enhance firm value by good management, or to hire a professional 
nonfamily manager and improve the firm performance by monitoring this manager 
through being a large shareholder. 
Therefore, we classify the family firm into three type family firms, family firm 
(M&O), family firm (O), and family firm (M). Firstly, the family firm (M&O) is a firm 
where the senior manager (president or chairman) is either the founder or his descendant, 
                                                 
3 We define family management as those firms in which the founder or his descendant 
is president or chairman. 
4 Later, we will determine the sensitivity of our results when we use alternative 
definitions of family firms. 
 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2007-005? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 
 5
and the founding family is the largest shareholder. In this type of firm, the founding 
family has influence through both management and ownership. According to classical 
agency theory, a benefit of the family firm (M&O) is that it has strong financial 
incentives to improve firm performance because they have a lot of equity. However, the 
main purpose of shareholdings by the founding family is more likely to preserve their 
control rather than invest for capital gain. In this case, family firm (M&O) might not pay 
enough attention to firm performance and take actions that benefit the founding family 
at the expense of other small shareholders. For example, even if the son does not 
demonstrate aptitude for management, the family can still promote him to senior 
manager. In addition, family firm (M&O) might take risk reduction strategy, which can 
impose costs on diversified minority shareholders due to the concentration of the 
founding family’s wealth in the equity of the “family firm (M&O)”. If these costs of the 
family firm (M&O) overtake their benefit, family firm (M&O) is devalued in the market. 
Second, the family firm (O) is a firm where the founding family is the largest 
shareholder, but the senior manager is not a family member. In this type of firm, the 
founding family has influence only through ownership. Hence, the founding family 
could monitor and discipline a manager as a large shareholder, and contribute to the 
firm performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Third, the family firm (M) is a firm where the senior manager is from the founding 
family, but the founding family is not the largest shareholder. In other words, there is a 
largest shareholder other than the founding family. In this type of firm, it is difficult to 
take actions that benefit the founding family at the expense of shareholders and firm 
performance, since a family senior manager is constrained by other large shareholders. 
However, a family senior manager may not have a strong financial incentive to improve 
firm performance because the family ownership level is low. Based on the agency 
problem, we can predict that the performance of this type of family firm will not differ 
from that of nonfamily firms. However, if the senior manager from the founding family 
has an inherent incentive or ability in the founding family, this type of family firm could 
outperform nonfamily firms. Anderson et al. (2003) argues that the family’s sustained 
presence in the firm creates powerful reputation effects that provide incentives for 
family managers to improve performance. Davis et al. (1997) suggests that family 
 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2007-005? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 
 6
members act as stewards and, as such, identify strongly with the firm and view firm 
performance as an extension of their own well-being. 
 
2-4. Generation and Affinity 
In many family firms, we can observe family succession. A typical example is when 
the family senior manager steps down, and his eldest son is promoted to the post of 
senior manager. The one problem with family succession is that family firms pick 
senior managers from a small and less competitive pool of family heirs. Perez-Gonzalez 
(2006) shows that family successions cause a decline in firm performance in the US. 
Adams et al. (2004) and Fahlenbrach (2004) show that founders and descendants have a 
very different impact on firm performance. 
That said, descendants might have family-specific capital with which to contribute 
firm value. Laband and Lentz (1986) and Lentz and Laband (1990) show the importance 
of intangible transfers between generations that take the form of specialized knowledge, 
goodwill, brand (or name) loyalty, and other types of family-specific capital. The value 
of this family-specific capital can be captured only by children who follow their parents 
into the family firm. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) show strong roles for family-specific 
capital and the transmission of these skills within families in enhancing the probability 
of making a transition to entrepreneurship. Hence, we classify family management into 
founder management, descendant management, 2nd generation management, and 3rd 
generation management.5  
In addition, we distinguish descendant-in-law senior managers (descendant-in-law 
management) from descendant-in-blood senior managers. By recruiting a capable man 
through marriage, the cost of a restricted executive pool may be mitigated. In the Edo 
era (1603AD–1867AD), merchant families in the Senba area of Osaka celebrated the 
birth of a daughter because it enabled them to recruit and train a capable man through 
marriage to the daughter. This ability to assess experienced adults before taking them on 
can be contrasted with the difficulty of identifying the ability of a son before he grows 
up. In the present period, several family firms are managed by descendants-in-law. For 
                                                 
5 The definitions are summarized in Table 1 and section 3.  
 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2007-005? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 
 7
example, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the founder Kounosuke Matsushita had 
only one daughter. She married Masaharu Hirata, who was a graduate of Tokyo 
University and worked at the Mitsui Bank. After the marriage, he joined Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., and he became the president at age 49. In Suzuki Motors, the 
2nd and 3rd presidents are sons-in-law of the founder Michio Suzuki. The 4th president, 
Osamu Suzuki is the son-in-law of the 2nd president. Now, Osamu Suzuki is chairman, 
and his first son and the husband of his first daughter are on the board of Suzuki Motors. 
If this is the case, we can predict that family firms managed by descendant-in-law senior 
manager outperform family firms managed by descendant-in-blood senior managers.    
 
2-5. Terms to Link Family Firm Type to Generation 
We use special terms to indicate the relationship between family firm type and the 
generation of the family senior managers. When the founder is active as president or 
chairman and the founding family is the largest shareholder, we classify this firm as a 
founder firm (M&O). When the founder is active, but the founding family is not the 
largest shareholder, we classify this firm as a founder firm (M). To use consistent 
terminology, we use the terms descendant firm (M&O), descendant firm (M), 2nd 
generation firm (M&O), 2nd generation firm (M), 3rd generation firm (M&O), 3rd 
generation firm (M), descendant-in-law firm (M&O), and descendant-in-law firm (M). 
When the founder is still active, ownership tends to be concentrated in the hands of 
the founder in most family firms. Therefore, we predict that most founder firms belong 
to founder firm (M&O). However, it is not necessarily true that the ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of the founding family after the founder retires because, as 
years pass, family ownership would be dispersed by the succession6, seasoned equity 
offerings and divestment of shares. Therefore, we predict that in the descendant 
generation, family firms may branch into descendant firm (M&O) and descendant firm 
(M) as a result of the founding family’s various choices. 
For the founding family, making seasoned equity offerings is one of the most 
important decisions which affect their control and the firm performance. Seasoned 
                                                 
6 Maximum succession tax rate was 70% until 2002 and became 50% after 2002. 
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equity offerings may deliver an expansion of the business, but also lower the ratio of 
family ownership, and undermine the ascendancy of the founding family. In a 
descendant firm (M&O), founding families may have chosen not to make seasoned 
equity offerings for fear of diluting family ownership. If this is the case, these types of 
firms may be traded at a discount relative to nonfamily firms. In a descendant firm (M), 
the founding family may accept the dilution of family ownership caused by seasoned 
equity offerings for the expansion of the business. Therefore, this type of family firm 
could outperform the descendant firm (M&O). However, the founding family would sell 
their shares if they believed the prospects of their business were fading. If this is the 
case, this type of family firm may be traded at a discount relative to nonfamily firms 
and a descendant firm (M&O). 
Succession to descendants is also one of the important decisions for founding family. 
Previous literatures (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) indicate that in 
family firms descendant senior managers harm the firm performance, because they can 
assume the senior manager even if their managerial ability is inferior. However, in 
descendant firm (M), large shareholders other than founding family might prevent the 
inferior descendants from becoming the senior manager. In this case, we can predict that 
descendant firm (M) outperforms descendant firm (M&O). 
We investigate the effects of family firms, family ownership, family management, 
family generation, and various types of family firms to firm performance, using 
firm-level data on Japanese publicly traded firms in the following sections. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
3-1. Sample and Family Firm Data 
In our investigation, we begin with all the firms included in The Corporate Financial 
Databank (compiled by the Development Bank of Japan) in 1990, which includes all 
the companies listed in both the first and second sections of the stock exchanges of 
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. From this list of firms, we exclude financial firms (187 
firms) and public utility firms (19 firms) due to the difficulty involved in calculating 
Tobin’s q in the bank sector, and government regulations that potentially affect firm 
performance and the relation between the founding family and the firm. Our sample 
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period is 1990–1998. The final sample includes 1,818 unique firms and 15,950 
firm-years from 1990 to 1998. In 1990, the number of listed firms in Japan was 
approximately 2,100 (including financial firms, public utility firms, and the firms listed 
in other stock exchanges). Therefore, our sample is almost equal to the total number of 
listed firms in Japan. This sample set enables us to obtain more general and 
comprehensive evidences on family firms in Japan. 
To identify and classify family firms, we collect family ownership and management 
data for all the sample firm-years.7 Family ownership is defined as the percentage of 
shares held by the founding family as a group. To construct family management data, 
we investigate the relationships of all the senior managers and founding families. Based 
on this management data, we define family management as those firms where the 
founder or his descendant is the president or chairman. Next, we distinguish between 
the generation and affinity of family management to derive founder management, 
descendant management, 2nd generation management, 3rd generation management, 
and descendant-in-law management.8,9,10 
Using these family ownership and management data, we now build on the terms 
identified in section 2-5 to compile the following: family firm, family firm (M&O), 
family firm (M), family firm (O), founder firm (M&O), founder firm (M), descendant 
firm (M&O), descendant firm (M), descendant-in-law firm (M&O), descendant-in-law 
firm (M), 2nd generation firm (M&O), 2nd generation firm (M), 3rd generation firm 
(M&O), and 3rd generation firm (M). 
 
3-2. Firm Performance and Control Variables 
Our primary performance measure is Tobin’s q, which has the advantage of 
indicating any possible corporate governance problems and potential growth. We 
                                                 
7 Refer to the Appendix for more detailed explanations on the construction of data on 
family ownership and management. 
8 When both president and chairman are members of the founding family, we use the 
older generation. For example, when the chairman is founder and the president is his 
son (2nd generation), we define this firm as founder management. 
9 There are several senior managers who are a brother of the founder. We define them 
as 2nd generation. 
10 3rd generation management also includes 4th or later generation management. 
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estimate Tobin’s q as the firm’s market value (the sum of the market value of equity and 
book value of leverage) divided by the replacement cost of assets (the real value of total 
assets).  
In Japan, the firm discloses only the book value of assets. When using the book value 
to measure Tobin’s q, systematic differences may be caused by firm age because Japan 
experienced high inflation in high growth period and sharp rises and falls in land values 
around 1990. This problem is serious for our research because, as we show in the next 
section, firm age significantly differs between family firms and nonfamily firms, and 
between the founder firm and the descendant firm. Therefore, we try to calculate the 
real value of total assets following Hori et al. (2006) and Miyajima et al. (2001). 
The data needed to calculate Tobin’s q and market value of assets is obtained from 
The Corporate Financial Databank compiled by the Development Bank of Japan. 
The definition of family firm variables, performance measures, and other control 
variables are explained at Table 1. All control variables except beta and idiosyncratic 
risk are obtained from The Corporate Financial Databank, compiled by the 
Development Bank of Japan. Beta and idiosyncratic risk is calculated using the Kabuka 
CD-ROM (published by Toyo Keizai Shinposya). All variables are adjusted to constant 
yen (the base period is March 2000) using the wholesale price index. 
 
3-3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the distribution of family ownership and family management for the 
1,818 sample firms in 1990. In the sample, 738 firms (40%) have a shareholder related 
to the founding family amongst the twenty largest shareholders. In 550 firms (30%), the 
founding family is the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity. The founding family is 
largest shareholder in 461 firms (25%). In terms of management, the senior manager is 
the founder or a member of founding family in 659 firms (36%). As a whole, family 
firms constitute about 40% (697 firms) of our sample firms. These results show that 
founding families are a prevalent and important class of shareholders and senior 
managers in Japanese public firms. 
Of the 697 family firms, 423 firms are classified into family firm (M&O), 236 firms 
are classified into family firm (M), and 38 firms are classified into family firm (O). 
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Compared with other countries, it is interesting that there are many family firms (M) 
where the senior manager is from the founding family, but ownership is not 
concentrated in the hands of the founding family in Japan. In 46 firms with a family 
senior manager, shareholders related to the founding family are not included in the list 
of the twenty largest shareholders, and in the quarter of firms with a family senior 
manager, family ownership is below 5%. 
Table 3 presents the prevalence of the family firm and three types of family firms by 
two-digit industry. Family firms are present in 85% of industries, indicating that family 
firms operate in a broad array of industries. However, we note that family firms appear 
to be the prevalent form in food, lumber and wood products, printing and publishing, 
metal products, precision instruments, building, wholesale and retail sales. In contrast, 
there are few family firms in oil, iron and steel, and railroad transportation. These 
results suggest the importance of the controlling industry’s affiliation in the empirical 
analysis.  
Table 4 provides means, medians, standard deviations, minimum values, and 
maximum values for the variables for all firms in the sample in 1990. Table 5 provides 
descriptive statistics, broken into family firms and nonfamily firms, and three types of 
family firms. The last two columns show the results of difference of means and medians 
tests between family firms and nonfamily firms.11  
The mean Tobin’s q of family firms is 0.1 higher than that of nonfamily firms, and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the difference in the 
median is statistically significant at the 1% level. When we use industry-adjusted 
tobin’s q, the differences are also statistically significant. These results suggest that 
family firms are better performers than are nonfamily firms in Japan. Across the various 
industries, the Tobin’s q of family firms is higher than nonfamily firms in 20 
industries.12  In six industries, these differences are statistically significant at the 
conventional level.13  
                                                 
11 We use t-tests to compare the means, and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to compare the 
medians. 
12 The 20 industries are Textiles & Apparel, Chemicals, Rubber, Iron & Steel, Metal 
Products, General Machinery, Electric Appliances, Transportation Equipment, Precision 
Instruments, Other Products, Dredging, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Railways, Road 
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Family firms are significantly smaller in terms of the mean and median of assets and 
sales compared to nonfamily firms. Family firms do not appear to use debt differently 
than nonfamily firms. Rows 19 and 20 of Table 5 show firm age since foundation and 
IPO. In our sample, the oldest firm is Surugaya, founded by Zen’uemon Okamoto in 
1461. Surugaya was still a family firm in our sample period.14 Successive presidents 
are from the Okamoto family. The median firm age since foundation and IPO of family 
firms is younger than that of nonfamily firms. This characteristic may raise a concern 
that the higher Tobin’s q of family firms may simply reflect different growth stages, 
because Tobin’s q varies positively with growth opportunities and young firms may 
have more of these. Therefore, we need to account for firm age in our regression 
analysis. The equity ownership by nonfamily shareholders is significantly lower in 
family firms than it is in nonfamily firms. It is surprising that a half of nonfamily firms 
have parent firms that have more than 15% equity. In other words, it is only 30% of 
firms among all Japanese public firms that have a hired senior manager and a dispersed 
ownership structure. 
Columns 3 to 8 provide descriptive statistics of three type family firms. The mean 
and median family ownership of family firm (M&O) is highest among three types of 
family firms. Surprisingly, average family ownership of family firm (M) is 3.98% and 
the median is 2.74%. Next, we compare the generation of senior managers. Consistent 
with our prediction, 80% of founder management firms belong to family firm (M&O). In 
contrast, the ratio of 2nd generation management firms belonging to family firm (M&O) 
is about 60% and 3rd generation firms belonging to family firm (M&O) is about 50%. 
Thus, as years pass, family ownership would be dispersed, and the corporate 
governance of family firms would be transformed. 
                                                                                                                                               
Passenger Transport, Warehousing, Films & Amusement, Business Services, 
Information Services, and Other Services. 
13 The six industries are Textiles & Apparel, Iron & Steel, General Machinery, Electric 
Appliances, Wholesale Trade, and Information Services. 
14 In 2005, the president of Surugaya was arrested for illegally issuing new equity. As a 
result, Surugaya was delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and a nonfamily member 
became president. 
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The mean and median firm performance of family firm (M&O) is highest among 
three types of family firms. This result would be caused by the difference in growth 
opportunities, because family firm (M&O) is younger than the others. The scale of 
family firm (M&O) is lowest among the three types of family firms. This result may be 
caused by differences in firm age too. Although not shown in the table, the mean and 
median assets of 2nd generation firm (M) are significantly larger than that of 2nd 
generation firm (M&O), and the median assets of 3rd generation firm (M) is 
significantly larger than that of 3rd generation firm (M&O). These results may be 
caused by the founding family’s attitude toward seasoned equity offerings. 
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of family firms, broken down by the 
generation of family management. The last two columns show differences in the means 
and medians between founder management and descendant management. The mean and 
median Tobin’s q of founder management is significantly higher than that of descendant 
management. Mean family ownership of founder management is about 19% and the 
founding family is the largest shareholder in most of them. By comparison, mean family 
ownership of descendant management is about 12% and about half of them have 
another largest shareholder. Row 4 of descendant management shows that 
descendant-in-law senior manager is not scarce. About 10% of descendant management 
firms take on a daughter’s husband as senior manager. 
In summary, there are significant differences in performance, size, capital structure, 
firm age, and family ownership between family firms and nonfamily firms, and within 
family firms. In the next section, we examine the relationship between family firms and 
firm performance using univariate and multivariate analysis. 
 
4. Family Firms and Performance 
Table 7 presents the univariate statistical analyses. Panel A provides the mean and 
median Tobin’s q when the sample of firms in 1990 is classified into four groups 
according to the founding families’ equity ownership and management. The mean and 
median Tobin’s q for family firm (M&O) and family firm (M) are significantly greater 
than the mean and median Tobin’s q for nonfamily firm. The mean and median Tobin’s 
q for family firm (O) are larger than those for nonfamily firm; however these differences 
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are insignificant at the conventional level. Panel B provides the mean and median 
Tobin’s q based on the founding families’ equity ownership and generation of the senior 
managers from the founding family. When the founder is still the firm’s president or 
chairman, Tobin’s q is higher than that of nonfamily firm. However, the differences 
between nonfamily firm and founder firm (M) that has others and not the founding 
family as the largest shareholder are insignificant. When the founder’s descendant 
becomes the senior manager after the founder has retired, the mean and median Tobin’s 
q of 1.51 and 1.36, respectively, for descendant firm (M) are significantly greater than 
the mean and median Tobin’s q of 1.41 and 1.24, respectively, for nonfamily firm; 
however, the mean and median Tobin’s q of descendant firm (M&O) are lower than 
those of nonfamily firm. 
The univariate statistics suggest that the performance of family firms is affected by 
the equity ownership of the founding family and the generation of senior managers from 
the founding family. However, the above univariate tests do not control the other 
determinants of family firms and Tobin’s q. In the next, we extend our analysis to a 
multivariate setting. Tables 8 and 9 report the results of multivariate OLS regressions to 
investigate the relationship between family firms and firm performance.15 We use 
Tobin’s q as our dependent variable.16 The independent variables are various family 
firm variables, control variables, industry dummy variables, and year dummy variables. 
We use the natural log of assets, leverage, the natural log of firm age since from 
foundation, beta, related firm 1 dummy, related firm 2 dummy, and affiliated firm 
dummy as control variables.17 Related firm 1 dummy, related firm 2 dummy and 
affiliated firm dummy indicate the presence of the large shareholder other than founding 
                                                 
15 The standard errors are clustered by firm level. In all regressions, we do not use the 
firms that have a Tobin’s q below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile, in 
order to exclude outliers. 
16 If we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s q or simple Tobin’s q that are calculated using the 
book value of assets, the results are similar, but they are less significant. 
17 When we use alternative sets of control variables, the results of family firm variables 
remain unchanged. We use sales instead of total assets, and firm age since IPO instead 
of firm age since foundation. In addition, we attempt to control firm size and firm age, 
using each of the 10 percentile group dummy variables. 
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family. Industry dummies and year dummies are included to control for industry and 
time effects.18 Our data spans from 1990 to 1998 and covers 1,818 firms. 
In Table 8, we estimate the performance of the firms, controlled by founding family. 
We find that family firms slightly outperform nonfamily firms in Japan. In column (1), 
the family firm dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the senior manager is a founding 
family member and/or largest shareholder is the founding family, is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. 
In order to detect what feature of the founding family contributes to this superior 
performance, we examine family ownership and family management effects on firm 
value in column (2) and (3). In column (2), we use family ownership, which is a 
measure of the share ratio held by the founding family. We find a positive and 
significant effect for family ownership.19 In contrast with this result, the effect of family 
management in column (3) is positive, but not significant at conventional levels.  
However, these results do not conclude that passive family control creates firm value, 
but that active family control does not contribute to firm value. As shown in section 3, 
there are many family firms both owned and managed by the founding family. Family 
ownership with and without family management has different implications. High family 
ownership of firms managed by the founding family may indicate the possibility of 
expropriation from small shareholders. On the other hand, high family ownership 
without family management may indicate the presence of an outside large shareholder. 
Therefore, we classify family firms into three types of family firms: family firms 
(M&O), family firms (M), and family firms (O). Column (4) of Table 8 shows the 
performance of these family firms. We find that family ownership contributes to firm 
performance only when the senior manager is a nonfamily member. In other words, 
large founding family shareholders plays a significant role in monitoring and 
                                                 
18 Pharmaceutical firms are prone to have a higher Tobin’s q. Therefore, we distinguish 
the pharmaceutical industry from the chemicals industry. 
19 Morck et al. (1988) show that the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance is nonlinear. Therefore, we include the square of family ownership in 
addition to family ownership. The effect of the square of family ownership is negative. 
However, in the interval of family ownership (maximum is 64.29%), the total marginal 
effect of family ownership is always positive. 
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disciplining hired managers. In contrast, family firms (M&O) and family firms (M) do 
not have significant effects on firm value. These results are not consistent with the 
results of the univariate test, where the mean and median Tobin’s q of family firm 
(M&O) are significantly superior to those of nonfamily firms. This fact indicates that 
the results of the univariate test might be the result of the substantial differences in age, 
size, and industry between family and nonfamily firms. 
The results we have reported so far do not distinguish between generations of family 
senior managers. Nevertheless, previous studies show that founders have an inherent 
impact on firm performance. Therefore, we investigate these differences caused by the 
generation of the founding family in detail in Table 9. 
In column (1), we classify family management into founder management and 
descendant management. The result is striking. We find that there is positive association 
between founder management and firm value but negative association between 
descendant management and firm value. The coefficient on founder management is 
strongly positive and significant at the 1% level, but descendant management is 
negative and significant at 5% level. The lower panel shows the result of a test of the 
null hypothesis that founder management and descendant management have the same 
effects on firm value. The result of this test shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at 
the 1% level. In other words, the performance of founder management is significantly 
superior to that of descendant management. 
However, as shown in Table 5, the founding family is the largest shareholder in 
many founder management firms. In contrast, descendant management firms often have 
large shareholders other than the founding family. This fact could cause the differences 
in performance. Hence, we make use of interaction terms between the generation of 
senior managers and family firm types (family firm (M&O), family firm (O), and family 
firm (M)). In column (2), we use the terms, founder firm (M&O), founder firm (M), 
descendant firm (M&O) and descendant firm (M) as independent variables.  
The results of this empirical analysis show that active founders contribute to firm 
value regardless of the family ownership level, but after the founder retires, the 
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performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder’s descendants is 
inferior to that of nonfamily firms and other types of family firms.20  
The coefficients on both founder firm (M&O) and founder firm (M) are positive and 
significant, and the Wald test in the lower panel shows that the difference between the 
effect of founder firm (M&O) and that of descendant firm (M&O), and between the 
effect of founder firm (M) and that of descendant firm (M) are both significant at 
conventional level. This result confirms previous findings that shareholders pay a 
premium for the founder’s presence (Fahlenbrach, 2004; Adams et al., 2004).  
The coefficient on descendant firm (M&O) is negative and significant at 5% level, 
and the wald test shows that the difference between the effect of descendant firm 
(M&O) and that of descendant firm (M) is statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
contrast, difference between the effect of founder firm (M&O) and that of founder firm 
(M) is not significant. This result shows that the valuation of the firm managed by 
founder is not affected by corporate governance problems between large founding 
family shareholders and small shareholders. But after the founder retires, this problem 
rises to the surface, and degrades the valuation of the family firms both owned and 
managed by the founder’s descendants.21 
                                                 
20 When we use return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable, the results are 
quantitatively similar except the effects of descendant firm (M&O), which become 
positive but not significant. This difference was probably caused by the fact that Tobin’s 
q reflects what management will accomplish, whereas ROA reflects what management 
has accomplished. The second difference between Tobin’s q and ROA lies in who is 
actually measuring performance. ROA is measured by accountants constrained by 
standards set by their profession, whereas Tobin’s q is determined by the community of 
investors constrained by their acumen, optimism, or pessimism. Therefore, our research 
may indicate that even though descendant firm (M&O) is an effective organizational 
structure at present, investors predict that this advantage will eventually vanish because 
of the corporate governance problem. 
21 Nonfamily firms include many firms that were founded by domestic companies, 
foreign companies, or government, or spun off from a parent company. These firms do 
not have a founder or founding families. In our sample, 777 of the 1,818 firms do not 
have a founder and founding family. In order to compare the performance of 
family-succession firms with that of nonsuccession firms that have broken off relations 
with their founding families due to hiring of nonfamily professional managers or selling 
out their shares, we exclude the firms which do not have founder and founding family 
from the full sample, and estimate the effect of descendant firms on Tobin’s q. Similarly, 
we find that the performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder’s 
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In column (3), we add descendant-in-law firm (M&O) and descendant-in-law firm 
(M) to the independent variables. In other words, the coefficients on descendant-in-law 
firm (M&O) and descendant-in-law firm (M) show differences in the effect of 
descendant-in-blood management and descendant-in-law management. The result is 
very interesting. Contrary to our prediction, the coefficients of descendant-in-law firm 
(M&O) and descendant-in-law firm (M) are both negative and significant, suggesting 
that the performance of family firms managed by descendant-in-law is inferior to that of 
family firms managed by descendant-in-blood. These results might indicate that 
descendant-in-law senior managers tend to create the situation of dual power between 
him and founding family, especially his wife’s father. This dual power might delay the 
decision-making process and cause inefficiency of management. As a result, family 
firms managed by descendant-in-law senior managers are devalued by investors. 
In column (4), we add 3rd generation firm (M&O) and 3rd generation firm (M) to 
the independent variables in column (2) to analyze the effects of different generations of 
the founder’s descendants on firm performance. The coefficients of 3rd generation firm 
(M&O) and 3rd generation firm (M) indicate the difference in the effect between 2nd 
generation management and 3rd generation management. However, we could not find 
significant differences between 2nd generation management and 3rd generation 
management. 
 
5. Robustness Test 
5-1. Alternative Definitions 
?  In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of our main result (column (2) in Table 9) 
to the use of alternative definitions of family firm and econometric techniques. 
Throughout the paper, we assume that the firms are managed by their founding 
families, when the founder or his descendant is the president or chairman and that firms 
are owned by their founding families, when the founding family is the largest 
shareholder. In this section, we use alternative definitions in order to analyze the 
sensitivity of our main result. 
                                                                                                                                               
descendants is inferior to that of nonsuccession firms.  
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Previous studies in the US, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) have less stringent requirements for family ownership. They define family firms 
as firms where the founder or a member of the founding family is an officer, director, or 
the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity. Based on this, we define family firms as 
firms where the founder or a member of the founding family is the chairman, president, 
or owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity rather than the largest shareholder.22 
However, the use of this alternative definition of family firm does not change our results. 
By adopting this definition, firms in which the founding family owns 5% or more of the 
firm’s equity, but is not the largest shareholder, and the founding family members are 
not president or chairman have newly been included in the category of family firm. 
However, this type of firms constitutes only 4% (30 firms) of alternative family firms 
(727 = 697 + 30 firms). Column (1) in Table 10 shows the results when we use an 
alternative classification rule with regard to family ownership. We classify the family 
firms into family firm (M&O), family firm (M) and family firm (O), based on whether 
the founding family is the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity rather than the 
largest shareholder. In other words, family firm (M&O) is a firm where the senior 
manager (president or chairman) is either the founder or his descendant, and the 
founding family owns 5% or more of the firm’s equity. Family firm (M) is a firm where 
the senior manager is either the founder or his descendant, but the founding family owns 
less than 5% of the firm’s equity. Family firm (O) is a firm where the founding family 
owns 5% or more of the firm’s equity, but the senior manager is not a family member. 
Based on this alternative classification rule, we obtain an alternative family firm (O), 
founder firm (M&O), founder firm (M), descendant firm (M&O) and descendant firm 
(M). However, when we use these alternative family firms as independent variables, the 
result of the OLS regression is quantitatively similar to our main result. 
Column (2) in Table 10 show the results when we use an alternative definition of 
senior manager. We define family management as those firms in which the founder or 
                                                 
22 We are unable to identify the family director (although we are able to identify the 
president, chairman, and representative directors), because reliable sources of the data 
for them are unavailable. 
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his descendant is the representative director23 rather than the president or chairman. In 
1990, it was found that 22 founders were not president and chairman but representative 
directors, and 9 founders were not representative directors but chairmen. Based on this 
alternative definition, we obtain an alternative family firm (O), founder firm (M&O), 
founder firm (M), descendant firm (M&O) and descendant firm (M). The result of the 
OLS regressions is almost the same as that of the previous results; however, founder 
firm (M) has a larger and more significant positive effect. In sum, our main result is 
robust to using these alternative definitions of family ownership and management. 
 
5-2. Alternative Econometric Techniques 
Columns (3)–(5) in Table 10 analyze the sensitivity of our main result to the use of 
alternative econometric techniques. 
In the previous regressions presented in Tables 8 and 9, we exclude from the sample 
the firms with a Tobin’s q below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile in 
order to address the difficulties associated with outliers in the data. In this section, we 
also estimate the same regression model, using the least absolute deviation criterion 
(instead of least squares deviation criterion) with respect to departures from the median. 
Column (3) in Table 10 shows the results of the median regression. The result is almost 
the same as the OLS result. 
  Our data consists of a cross-sectional time-series panel. In the main tests, we control 
for lack of independence among observations from the same firm by estimating robust 
OLS regressions with clusters based on firms. An alternative test procedure is to use a 
random effects and fixed effects model. Panel regression allows us to take into account 
the unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity of our firms. When we use the random 
                                                 
23 Article 362 of the Commercial Code in Japan stipulates that “the company shall 
appoint by the resolution of the board of directors, the particular director who shall 
represent the company.” Representative directors have the authority to represent the 
company in taking external actions and are entrusted with daily executions. Our sample 
firms have 2.4 representative directors per firm. Itochu Corporation had 28 
representative directors in 1991, which is the maximum number of representative 
directors in our sample. When we use the ratio of family representative directors (= the 
number of family representative directors/number of representative directors) as 
independent variables, the coefficient is positive, but not significant. 
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effects model, the result is qualitatively identical to the OLS result in Table 9. However, 
when we use the fixed effects model, the result is considerably different from the 
previous OLS result. The effect of the active founder is strongly positive in OLS 
regressions but is insignificant in fixed effects regression. This difference is expected 
since the fixed effects coefficients are only identified from within-firm changes from a 
family firm category to another family or nonfamily firm category. In family firms, the 
management positions are frequently inherited by the founding family members. A good 
example of this would be that when a founder resigns from a senior manager’s position, 
the founder’s descendant becomes the new senior manager. In this case, descendant firm 
(M&O) dummy variable changes from 0 to 1 at the same time as founder firm (M&O) 
dummy variable changes from 1 to 0. In our sample, there are 93 cases of management 
succession from the founder to his descendant; however, there are only 40 cases of 
management succession from the founder to a nonfamily member. In other words, 
founder firm (M&O) and descendant firm (M&O), and founder firm (M) and descendant 
firm (M) are strongly correlated with each other in the fixed effects model. When we 
exclude descendant firm (M&O) and descendant firm (M) from the set of independent 
variables, the coefficients of founder firm (M&O) and founder firm (M) become positive 
and significant. 
  An alternative method for controlling the time-invariant differences in firms’ 
characteristics is to compare firm performance before and after each transition of family 
firms. Table 11 shows the performance changes around each transition of family firms 
caused by the succession of family senior managers. To prevent results from capturing 
time or differential industry trends, we estimate the change in industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
q. We define change in industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as industry-adjusted Tobin’s q at two 
years after transition minus industry-adjusted Tobin’s q at two years before transition. 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is defined as Tobin’s q minus industry median Tobin’s q.  
Transitions of family firms mainly occur at time of successions of family senior 
managers. When the founder resigns from the senior manager’s position and the 
founder’s descendants become the new senior managers, founder firm (M&O) is 
transited to descendant firm (M&O), or founder firm (M) is transited to descendant firm 
(M). However, when the founders resigns from the senior manager’s position and 
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nonfamily members become the new senior managers, founder firm (M&O) is transited 
to family firm (O), or founder firm (M) is transited to nonfamily firm. Likewise, 2nd 
generation firm (M&O) is transited to 3rd generation firm (M&O) or family firm (O), 
and 2nd generation firm (M) is transited to 3rd generation firm (M) or nonfamily firm.24  
When founder firm (M&O) is transited to descendant firm (M&O), we find that 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q falls by 0.11 on average, significant at the five-percent level. 
In contrast, when founder firm (M&O) is transited to family firm (O), industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s q rises by 0.16, but insignificantly. In addition, the difference in performance 
change between the transition from founder firm (M&O) to descendant firm (M&O) and 
to family firm (O) is significant at the five-percent level. The results of the median 
changes exhibit a similar pattern. These results are consistent with Perez-Gonzalez 
(2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007) and our previous finding that family firms managed by 
descendant senior managers are devalued by investors. However, we could not find 
significant results for other transitions. This lack of significance is expected because the 
number of transitions is likely to be too small.  
 
5-3. Endogeneity Problem 
Many founding families are in a position to determine the structure of management 
and the ownership levels of family firms. For example, when founders or their 
descendants retire from management positions, they could choose between leaving their 
management positions to their descendants or hiring nonfamily professional managers. 
Founding families could also sell out their equity stake to a third party. 
Figure 1 illustrates the transition of family firms in our sample period. This figure 
indicates that family firms often make the important decisions that change the structure 
of ownership and management of family firms. For example, 45 firms of 197 founder 
firms (M&O) in 1990 do not belong to the founder firm (M&O) category after four years, 
and 91 firms do not belong to founder firm (M&O) after eight years (not shown in 
Figure 1). In 24 firms of 197 founder firm (M&O) in 1990, founders retired from 
management positions, and their descendants, mostly their sons, succeeded within four 
                                                 
24 The number of all other transition cases caused by the succession of family senior 
managers is less than two. 
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years. In contrast, after the founders retired, nonfamily members assumed the 
management position in 14 founder firms (M&O). Focusing on family ownership, the 
founding family was the largest shareholder in 461 firms in 1990, but in 55 of 461 firms, 
the founding family stepped down from the largest shareholder position after eight 
years.  
If these changes are determined by firm performance or characteristics, our previous 
analyses potentially suffer from an endogeneity problem.25 In particular, founding 
families may have superior information and foresight about the firm because they have 
large equity stakes, senior management positions, and long-term relationships with the 
firm. Therefore, founding families may have incentives to reduce their equity stakes or 
step down from management positions when information asymmetries suggest to them 
that the firm’s prospects have diminished. In fact, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) show 
that nonfamily member appointments to senior manager positions tend to follow a 
period of poor performance. 
We tackle this issue using a treatment effects model that estimates jointly the 
probability of being a family firm, and an outcome equation for market valuation 
(Maddala, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997; Green, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002). We adopt a 
maximum likelihood procedure and standard errors are clustered by firm level. This 
method is more efficient than the traditional two-stage method. The treatment group is a 
dummy that equals one for family firms as a whole or for one of the five types of family 
firms. The outcome variable is Tobin’s q. Sample firms are comprised of only the 
family firm in the category analyzed and nonfamily firms because we can use only one 
treatment variable in each estimation. 
To meet the exclusion restrictions necessary for identification, we use number of 
negative profit as the exogenous variable in the treatment equation model. Number of 
negative profit is the number of times before-tax after-interest profit is negative after an 
                                                 
25 Several previous studies argue that the ownership structure varies systematically in a 
way that is consistent with value maximization. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) show that the ownership structure is determined by firm size, 
profit variability and government regulation. Himmelberg et al. (1999) show that 
managerial ownership is determined endogenously. 
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IPO.26 We use number of negative profit as a long-term firm performance measure. The 
correlation between Tobin’s q and number of negative profit is 0.001, which is not 
significantly different from zero. In addition, we use idiosyncratic risk as an exogenous 
variable. According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, Tobin’s q is a function of 
market risk (beta), but not of idiosyncratic risk, because idiosyncratic risk can be 
eliminated by holding a well-diversified portfolio. However, founding families should 
care about both types of risk because their wealth tends to be concentrated in the equity 
of the “family firm”. The treatment equation model also includes industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s q to test for potential reverse causation. Other variables in the treatment 
equation are natural log of assets, leverage, beta, and natural log of firm age since the 
IPO. In the outcome equation model, we use leverage, natural log of firm age since 
foundation, beta, related firm 1 dummy, related firm 2 dummy, affiliated firm dummy, 
industry dummies, and year dummies. 
In Table 12, we summarize the results obtained from the estimation of the treatment 
effects model for Tobin’s q. The upper panel includes the results from the outcome 
equation and the lower panel contains the estimates for the treatment equation. The 
treatment equation results confirm that family ownership and management are 
themselves a function of prior performance. The coefficients of industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s q are positive and significant for the family firm as whole, including both 
founder firms and descendant management-only family firms. However, the same 
coefficient is negative and significant for descendant firm (M&O). Number of negative 
profit has negative effects for all types of family firms. The coefficient on log of assets 
is negative and significant for descendant firm (M&O). This result may indicate that 
descendant firms (M&O) have not chosen to issue new equity, to prevent the dilution of 
family ownership. 
The results of the outcome equations strongly confirm the robustness of our findings 
in the OLS regressions. The effect of descendant firm (M&O) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. The effect of descendant firm (M) is positive and significant 
at the 1% level, although these effects are not significant in the OLS regressions. These 
                                                 
26 Due to data constraints, only profit data after 1956 is used for firms listed before 
1955. 
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results may suggest that descendant senior manager have a family-specific ability and 
an incentive transferred between generations. However, this benefit might by offset by 
less competitive succession and the probability of expropriation from small 
shareholders, when founding family is the largest shareholder. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
We have investigated the relationship between family firms and firm value. Family 
firms are different from the well-known “Berle and Means firm”, where ownership is 
dispersed among small shareholders, but control is concentrated in the hands of 
professional managers. In addition, family firms are prevalent around the world. 
However, they have received relatively little attention. Using data from 1,818 publicly 
traded firms in Japan from 1990 to 1998, we construct a new dataset on founding 
families, which includes founding family ownership, family management, and 
generation of family senior managers. We find that founding families are a prevalent 
and important class of shareholders and senior managers in Japan. Family firms 
constitute about 38% of our sample firms. In addition, we find that after the founder 
retires, family ownership is dispersed and the corporate governance of family firms is 
transformed. In half of family firms, ownership and management are separated after the 
founder retires. 
We empirically find that family firms slightly outperform nonfamily firms in Japan. 
However, the family firm premium has mainly arisen from active founders. After 
founders retire, the results are mixed. We find that the performance of family firms both 
owned and managed by the founder’s descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms, 
but the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder’s descendants is 
superior to that of nonfamily firms. These results may indicate that founders add firm 
value through their valuable skills, and a poor performance of descendant firms is 
mainly the result of governance problems between large and small shareholders. 
However, as is often observed with identified correlations between governance structure 
and firm value, simultaneity issues complicate the interpretation of our findings. We can 
propose some other interpretations that involve a selection effect rather than such a 
causal link. For example, founders do not resign from senior management positions of 
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well-performing firms, or nonfamily members do not take over the management of 
poorly performing firms from founding family members. To address these endogeneity 
problems, we use the treatment effects model that jointly estimates the probability of 
being a family firm and an outcome equation for market valuation, and confirm the 
robustness of our findings in the OLS regressions. However, we might have failed to 
fully address the simultaneity issue because we may have made very strong 
identification assumptions that number of negative profit and idiosyncratic risk affect 
the decision of family firms, but not firm value. 
Furthermore, we find that contrary to the general view that recruiting a capable man 
through marriage mitigates the inherent cost of restricted executive pool in founding 
family, investors devalue family firms managed by descendants-in-law compared with 
family firms managed by descendants-in-blood. 
Our results raise new and important research questions of how these founding 
families affect the behavior of the firm, for example, their investment and payout policy. 
Because the performance of family firms is different from that of nonfamily firms, we 
can predict that the founding family affects the behavior of the firm. Therefore, more 
effort is needed for developing a better understanding of family firms. 
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Appendix: Family Ownership and Management Data 
Since comprehensive data sources on the ownership and management of founding 
families are not available in Japan, we manually collect data from several sources, for 
the period 1990 through 1998, for 1,818 sample firms. 
For this purpose, we first identify the founders and founding families of all 1,818 
sample firms, using the Firm History Book (published by Toyo Keizai Shinposya). The 
Firm History Book presents the history of 3,072 Japanese firms, which include all the 
listed firms in 1995. In instances where we are unable to identify the founder and 
founding family from the Firm History Book, we use Yuka Syoken Hokokusyo and 
Nikkei Telecom 21.27 If we are still unable to identify the founder and founding family, 
we label these firms as nonfounder firms, which include firms founded by other 
companies or the government, and spin-off from the parent companies. When there is 
more than one founder, we consider the founding family to be the family with the 
largest share holding. For example, Sony was founded by Akio Morita and Masaru 
Ibuka. In 1990, although the Morita family owned 6.4% of the shareholding, the Ibuka 
family was not included among the twenty largest shareholders. Therefore, we consider 
the Morita family as the founding family of Sony. 
Next, we obtain family ownership data for all the sample years. Family ownership is 
the percentage of shares held by the founding family as a group. To collect family 
ownership data, we refer to the annual editions of Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (published by 
Toyo Keizai Shinposya), which includes a list of the twenty largest shareholders of each 
firm. In instances where no shareholder in this list is related to the founding family, 
family ownership is considered to be zero. On the other hand, in instances where more 
than one shareholder is related to the founding family, family ownership is considered 
to be an aggregation of these. However, there is great difficulty in determining actual 
family ownership. Many founding families have a holding company or foundation.28 
                                                 
27 Yuka Syoken Houkousyo corresponds with 10-K filings in the US. Nikkei Telecom 21 
is an electric newspaper archive, which includes the Nikkei, Nikkei Business Daily, 
Nikkei Marketing Journal and Nikkei Financial Daily.  
28 In Japan, many founding families establish holding companies in order to preserve 
their assets. The use of holding companies instead of direct holdings has many tax 
benefits (especially in cases involving inheritance). Most of the holding companies are 
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For instance, in the case of Sony, in the 1990s, Akio Morita and his family were not 
included in the list of largest shareholders. However, Reikei, which is the Morita 
family’s holding company, owned 5.4% of the shareholdings and was the largest 
shareholder of Sony. To identify these companies and foundations, we refer to Dai 
Kabunushi Soran (published by Toyo Keizai Shinposya), which provides the 
background of large shareholders. Dai Kabunushi Soran identifies the holding company 
and foundation of the founding family, based on the substantial shareholding report 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance. In Japan, the substantial shareholding report 
system requires a person or entity to file the same if it becomes a beneficial holder of 
more than 5% of the shares of a listed firm. This shareholding is defined as an aggregate 
of the shareholdings of associated companies and parties that have entered into a 
concerted agreement with the purchaser. For example, if the founder owns 3% of the 
shareholdings and his holding company owns 5% of the firm’s equity, the founder or his 
holding company has to prepare a report stating that they owns 8% of the firm’s equity. 
Finally, we construct family management data for all the sample years. The 
information on the companies’ senior managers (chairman, president and other 
representative directors) is sourced from the annual editions of Yakuin Shikiho 
(published by Toyo Keizai Shinposya), which provides the names and titles of all the 
directors of public companies in Japan. We investigate the blood and affinity relations 
between the founder and all senior managers for the sample years by referring to Nikkei 
Telecom 21. The Nikkei and Nikkei Business Daily report the backgrounds of new 
presidents including information such as whether they are members of the founding 
family and are related to the founder or previous president. In instances where the 
chairmen or other representative directors have never been president, we search for 
other articles that provide information on their backgrounds by using the relevant name 
as the keyword. In addition, we use the Directory of Directors in 1983 (published by 
Zaikai Kenkyusyo). This directory lists the names and relations of the directors’ family 
members. However, we are unable to use this directory as the main data source since it 
                                                                                                                                               
privately held companies. We assume that founding families hold 100% of their holding 
companies’ equity. 
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is slightly outdated and does not include data of all the directors. Therefore, we use this 
directory to verify and complement our family management data. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Defnitions
Family firm variables
Family firm Equals one if founder or his descendant is a president or chairman and/or founding
family is the largest shareholder of the firm.
Family ownership Ratio of shares held by founding family as a group to total shares.
Family management Equals one if founder or his descendant is a president or chairman.
Family firm (M&O) Equals one if founder or his descendant is a president or chairman and founding family is
the largest shareholder of the firm.
Family firm (M) Equals one if founder or his descendant is a president or chairman, but founding family is
not the largest shareholder of the firm.
Family firm (O) Equals one if founding family is the largest shareholder of the firm, but senior manager is
nonfamily member.
Founder management Equals one if founder is a president or chairman.
Descendant management Equals one if founder's descendant is a president or chairman after founder retired.
2nd generation management Equals one if 2nd generation founding family member is a president or chairman after
founder retired.
3rd generation management Equals one if 3rd generation founding famly member is a president or chairman after
founder and 2nd generation founding family member retired.
Descendant-in-law management Equals one if in-law founding family member is a president or chairman after founder
retired.
Family representative director The number of representative directors from founding family.
Family representative director ratio Number of family representative directors/number of representative directors. (%)
Performance variables
Tobin's q Book value of leverage plus market value of shares divided by market value of assets.
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q Tobin's q  minus industry median Tobin's q.
ROA Ratio of operating income before tax and interests to market value of assets. (%)
Industry-adjusted ROA ROA minus industry median ROA.
Number of negative profit Number of the times when before-tax after-interest profit is negative after IPO. Due to
data constraint, we use the profit data after 1956 for the firm listed before 1955.
Control variables
Assets Book value of assets minus book value of tangible asssets plus market value of tangible
assets.
Leverage Ratio of the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt to total assets. (%)
Beta Estimate from market model in which the firm's monthly stock returns over the 60
months are regressed on the TOPIX monthly returns.
Idiosyncratic risk Standard deviation of residuals from market model in which the firm's monthly stock
returns over the 60 months are regressed on the TOPIX monthly returns.
Related firm 1 Equals one if largest shareholder other than founding family has 15%-33.3% shares.
Related firm 2 Equals one if largest shareholder other than founding family has 33.4%-50% shares.
Affiliated firm Equals one if largest shareholder other than founding family has over 50% shares.
 
Notes: This table shows the definitions of the variables used in the analyses. Detailed explanations 
on the construction of family ownership and management data are in Appendix. Performance 
variables and control variables except beta and idiosyncratic risk are obtained from the Corporate 
Financial Databank, compiled by the Development Bank of Japan. Beta and idiosyncratic risk is 
calculated using the Kabuka CD-ROM (published by Toyo Keizai Shinposya). 
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Table 2. Prevalence of Founding Family in Japanese Publicly Traded Firms 
Family ownership Senior manager notfrom founding family
Senior manager from
founding family Sum
Family ownership = 0 1034 46 1080
0 < Family ownership < 5 57 131 188
5 <= Family ownership < 10 30 125 155
10 <= Family ownership < 20 26 173 199
20 <= Family ownership 12 184 196
Sum 1159 659 1818
Family is largest shareholder 38 423 461
Family management
 
Notes: This table shows the prevalence of founding family in Japanese publicly traded firms in 1990. The sample consists of the firms listed on the First and 
Second Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with financial firms and public utility firms excluded. Family 
ownership is the percentage of shares held by the founding family as a group. Senior manager indicates president and chairman. Detailed explanations on 
the construction of family ownership and management data are in Appendix. 
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Table 3. Number and Percent of Family and Nonfamily Firms 
Industry description Nonfamilyfirms
Family firm
(M&O)
Family firm
(M)
Family fim
(O) Sum
Percent family
firms in industry
Foods 57 27 16 4 47 45.19
Textiles & apparel 55 7 10 0 17 23.61
Lumber & wood 2 4 0 0 4 66.67
Paper & pulp 22 8 2 0 10 31.25
Publishing & printing 5 6 1 0 7 58.33
Chemicals 107 24 25 4 53 33.13
Oil & coal 7 0 1 0 1 12.50
Rubber 11 5 2 0 7 38.89
Glass & ceramics 45 9 11 0 20 30.77
Iron & steel 43 9 3 1 13 23.21
Nonferrous metals 33 4 3 0 7 17.50
Metal products 33 19 8 1 28 45.90
General machinery 108 37 33 4 74 40.66
Electric applicances 100 32 27 8 67 40.12
Transportation equipment 82 14 19 0 33 28.70
Precision instruments 19 6 8 1 15 44.12
Other products 28 21 9 0 30 51.72
Fishery 2 0 0 0 0 0.00
Mining 8 0 0 0 0 0.00
Construction 39 35 12 3 50 56.18
Dredging 3 2 0 0 2 40.00
Other construction 43 4 1 0 5 10.42
Wholesale trade 69 55 16 6 77 52.74
Retail trade 46 61 12 1 74 61.67
Real estate 27 5 0 0 5 15.63
Railways 19 1 2 0 3 13.64
Road passenger transport 5 2 1 0 3 37.50
Road freight transport 8 3 4 0 7 46.67
Marine transportation 19 1 2 1 4 17.39
Air transportation 4 0 0 0 0 0.00
Warehousing 9 3 1 1 5 35.71
Harbor transportation 14 3 2 1 6 30.00
Comunication 2 0 0 0 0 0.00
Hotel 9 0 0 0 0 0.00
Films & amusement 21 4 3 0 7 25.00
Broadcasting 4 0 0 0 0 0.00
Business services 2 1 0 0 1 33.33
Information services 7 5 0 0 5 41.67
Other services 4 6 2 2 10 71.43
1121 423 236 38 697 38.34
Family firm
 
Notes: This table shows the number and percent of family firms and nonfamily firms by two-digit 
industry in 1990. The industry classification is based on the Corporate Financial Databank, 
compiled by the Development Bank of Japan. The sample consists of the firms listed on the First and 
Second Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with 
financial firms and public utility firms excluded. Family firm is defined as those in which the 
founder or his descendant is a president or chairman and/or the founding family is the largest 
shareholder in the firm. Family firm (M&O) is a firm where the senior manager (president or 
chairman) is either the founder or his descendant, and the founding family is the largest shareholder. 
Family firm (M) is a firm where the senior manager is either the founder or his descendant, but the 
founding family is not the largest shareholder. Family firm (O) is a firm where the founding family is 
the largest shareholder, but the senior manager is not a founding family member. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics in 1990 
Mean Median Standard
deviation
Min Max
Number of firms
Family ownership (%) 5.82 0 10.65 0 64.29
Largest shareholder is founding family 0.25 0 0.44 0 1
Family representative director 0.51 0 0.51 0 4
Family Firm 0.38 0 0.49 0 1
Family representative director ratio (%) 27.18 0 40.02 0 100
Senior manager is from founding family 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
Tobin's q 1.45 1.28 0.70 0.39 7.13
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q 0.11 –0.02 0.65 –1.44 5.71
ROA (%) 6.89 6.31 3.59 –10.92 42.78
Industry-adjusted ROA (%) 0.17 –0.17 3.44 –18.59 36.70
Assets (billion yen) 196 55 625 1.80 14800
Sales (billion yen) 204 48 104 0.79 18900
Leverage (%) 22.05 20.66 14.98 0.00 91.38
Beta 0.98 0.99 0.40 –0.61 3.59
Idiosyncratic risk 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.37
Firm age since foundation 62.86 56.00 38.20 9 529
Firm age since IPO 26.19 29.00 12.61 1 41
Ownership by largest shareholder
(except founding family) (%)
16.98 8.77 15.90 1.36 72.03
Related firm 1 0.19 0 0.39 0 1
Related firm 2 0.11 0 0.31 0 1
Affiliated firm 0.07 0 0.26 0 1
1818
All firms
 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics in 1990. The sample consists of the firms listed on 
the First and Second Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 
1990, with financial firms and public utility firms excluded. Family ownership is the percentage of 
shares held by the founding family as a group. Family firm is defined as those in which the founder 
or his descendant is the senior manager (president or chairman) and/or the founding family is the 
largest shareholder in the firm. The definitions of other variables are explained at Table 1. Financial 
data are obtained from the Corporate Financial Databank, compiled by the Development Bank of 
Japan. Beta and idiosyncratic risk is calculated using the Kabuka CD-ROM (published by Toyo 
Keizai Shinposya). 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics for Family and Nonfamily Firms 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-test
Wilcoxon
rank-sum
test
Number of firms
Family ownership (%) 14.62 11.47 20.40 17.44 3.98 2.74 16.42 12.51 0.36 0.00 36.54 36.42
Founder management 0.37 0 0.47 0 0.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 25.10 21.64
Descendant management 0.58 1 0.53 1 0.75 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 39.18 28.85
2nd generation management 0.42 0 0.41 0 0.50 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 28.92 23.94
3rd generation management 0.16 0 0.12 0 0.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 23.94 13.79
Descendant-in-law management 0.06 0 0.06 0 0.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 8.47 8.31
Family representative director 1.30 1 1.40 1 1.31 1 0.08 0 0.01 0 62.71 38.78
Family representative director ratio (%) 70.16 100 78.81 100 65.72 50 3.21 0 0.04 0 68.15 38.77
Tobin's q 1.51 1.35 1.53 1.36 1.49 1.34 1.46 1.30 1.41 1.24 3.11 3.63
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.07 –0.03 0.07 –0.06 3.15 3.73
ROA (%) 7.64 7.05 8.10 7.45 6.80 6.29 7.76 6.90 6.43 6.02 7.10 7.22
Industry-adjusted ROA (%) 0.77 0.21 1.15 0.47 0.09 –0.12 0.78 0.66 –0.20 –0.48 6.01 6.08
Assets (billion yen) 14.30 5.00 11.10 4.37 20.20 7.02 13.60 4.15 22.80 5.70 2.84 2.30
Sales (billion yen) 12.10 4.49 9.37 4.09 17.20 5.84 11.30 4.08 25.60 5.06 2.68 1.86
Leverage (%) 20.75 19.13 20.48 18.40 21.36 20.52 20.02 18.89 22.87 21.31 2.93 2.73
Beta 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.98 0.98 0.85 0.83 1.03 1.05 5.19 5.12
Idiosyncratic risk 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.53 0.39
Firm age since foundation 63.68 55.00 58.53 52.00 71.53 60.00 72.21 54.50 62.35 56.00 0.72 2.31
Firm age since IPO 20.72 27.00 16.57 16.00 28.28 29.00 19.97 19.00 29.58 29.00 15.51 14.96
Ownership by largest shareholder
(except founding family) (%)
7.90 5.20 5.52 4.98 12.50 7.63 5.71 4.99 22.62 18.30 21.49 23.22
Related firm 1 0.08 0 0.01 0 0.21 0 0.00 0 0.26 0 9.53 9.31
Related firm 2 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.16 0 10.22 9.94
Affiliated firm 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.02 0 0.00 0 0.11 0 8.40 8.25
Family firm
697
Family firm type
Nonfamily firmsFamily firm (M&O)
423 38236
Family firm vs
nonfamily firm
Family firm (M) Family firm (O)
1121
 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for family firm, three type family firms and nonfamily firm in 1990. The sample consists of the firms listed on the First and Second 
Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with financial firms and public utility firms excluded. The last two columns show the results of 
t-test and wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the difference of means and medians between family firms and nonfamily firms. Family firm is defined as those in which the founder or 
his descendant is a president or chairman and/or the founding family is the largest shareholder in the firm. Family firm (M&O) is a firm where the senior manager (president or 
chairman) is either the founder or his descendant, and the founding family is the largest shareholder. Family firm (M) is a firm where the senior manager is either the founder or his 
descendant, but the founding family is not the largest shareholder. Family firm (O) is a firm where the founding family is the largest shareholder, but the senior manager is not a 
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family member. 
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Family Firms Clustered by Management Generation 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-test
Wilcoxon
rank-sum
test
Number of firms
Family ownership (%) 18.55 15.35 12.01 8.50 12.76 9.48 9.96 5.99 6.50 6.78
Largest shareholder is family 0.77 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.47 0.00 5.57 5.44
Descendant-in-law management 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00 5.66 5.54
Family representative director 1.49 1 1.29 1 1.32 1 1.22 1 4.10 4.18
Family representative director ratio (%) 82.82 100 68.60 66.67 70.92 66.67 62.32 50 6.00 5.85
Tobin's q 1.66 1.48 1.42 1.27 1.42 1.29 1.42 1.22 3.28 3.90
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q 0.25 0.11 0.12 –0.02 0.11 –0.01 0.14 –0.07 2.44 3.02
ROA (%) 8.61 7.98 7.03 6.51 7.28 6.69 6.36 6.01 5.22 5.67
Industry-adjusted ROA (%) 1.46 0.86 0.33 0.00 0.53 0.07 –0.22 –0.30 3.91 3.83
Assets (billion yen) 11.80 4.69 15.90 5.40 14.90 5.05 18.50 6.14 1.32 0.95
Sales (billion yen) 9.80 4.36 13.70 4.72 12.70 4.48 16.20 6.73 1.27 0.56
Leverage (%) 19.53 17.63 21.69 20.78 21.67 20.81 21.76 20.58 1.91 2.64
Beta 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.96 1.00 4.99 5.38
Idiosyncratic risk 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.08 2.40
Firm age since foundation 42.25 41.00 76.74 66.00 61.91 62.00 116.72 92.00 9.78 15.86
Firm age since IPO 13.25 8.00 25.54 28.00 23.82 28.00 30.17 29.00 13.60 12.02
Ownership by largest shareholder
(except founding family) (%)
7.09 4.99 8.62 5.60 8.52 5.53 8.89 5.94 2.55 4.44
Related firm 1 0.07 0 0.10 0 0.09 0 0.12 0 1.36 1.36
Related firm 2 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.00 0 0.58 0.58
Affiliated firm 0.00 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.87 0.87
Founder management vs
descendant management
Descendant management
256 403 294 109
Founder
management
Descendant
management
2nd generation
management
3rd generation
management
 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for family firms clustered by management generation in 1990. The sample consists of the firms managed by 
the founder or his descendant. The last two columns show the results of t-test and wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare the difference of means and medians 
between founder management and descendant management. Founder management is defined as those in which the founder is a president or chairman. 
Descendant management is defined as those in which the founder’s descendant is a president or chairman after the founder retired. 
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Table 7. Univariate Test: Tobin’s q and Family Firms 
Nonfamily Family
Panel A
Largest shareholder is
Nonfamily Nonfamily firm Family firm (M)
Mean Tobin's q 1.41 1.49*
Median Tobin's q 1.24 1.34**
Sample size 1121 236
Family Family firm (O) Family firm (M&O)
Mean Tobin's q 1.46 1.53***
Median Tobin's q 1.30 1.36***
Sample size 38 423
Founder Descendant
Panel B
Largest shareholder is
Nonfamily Founder firm (M) Descendant firm (M)
Mean Tobin's q 1.43 1.51*
Median Tobin's q 1.28 1.36**
Sample size 59 177
Family Founder firm (M&O) Descendant firm (M&O)
Mean Tobin's q 1.73*** 1.35
Median Tobin's q 1.54*** 1.21
Sample size 197 226
Manangement
Manangement
 
Notes: This table reports the mean and median Tobin’s q for various types of family firms and 
nonfamily firms in 1990. The sample consists of the firms listed on the First and Second Sections of 
the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with financial firms and 
public utility firms excluded. Family management is defined as those in which the founder or his 
descendant is a president or chairman. Founder management is defined as those in which the founder 
is a president or chairman. Descendant management is defined as those in which the founder’s 
descendant is a president or chairman after the founder retired. *, **, and *** indicate that the 
difference of means and medians between each family firm and nonfamily firm is significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. To test the difference of medians, wilcoxon rank-sum test is 
used. 
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Table 8. OLS Regressions: Tobin’s q and Family Firms 
0.168 *** 1.024 *** 1.714 *** 1.687 ***
(0.108) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110)
0.024 *
(0.014)
0.002 **
(0.001)
0.009
(0.014)
0.017
(0.018)
0.019
(0.017)
0.103 **
(0.048)
–0.016 –0.014 –0.023 –0.016
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
–0.075 *** –0.073 *** –0.083 *** –0.074 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
–0.084 *** –0.085 *** –0.092 *** –0.084 ***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
0.0005 0.002 –0.0003 0.0004
(0.0044) (0.005) (0.0053) (0.0054)
–0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0004 –0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
–0.072 *** –0.072 *** –0.074 *** –0.073 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
–0.039 *** –0.035 ** –0.042 *** –0.038 ***
(0.151) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Industry dummy
Year dummy
R2
Sample size
Family management
Family firm (M&O)
(4)
Intercept
Family firm
Family ownership(%)
Family firm (M)
Family firm (O)
Dependent variables: Tobin's q
(1) (2) (3)
Leverage
Log of firm age since foundation
Beta
Yes
Log of assets
Related firm 1
Related firm 2
Affiliated firm
Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes
15637 15637 15637 15637
0.340 0.342 0.340 0.340
 
Notes: This table shows the results of OLS regressions with 15,590 firm-year observations. The 
sample consists of the firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, 
Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with financial firms and public utility firms excluded. The 
sample period is from 1990 to 1998. Firms that have a Tobin’s q below the 1st percentile or above 
the 99th percentile are excluded from regressions. In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected 
for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. OLS Regressions: Tobin’s q and Family Firms 
1.607 *** 1.602 *** 1.592 *** 1.603 ***
(0.106) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110)
0.116 ***
(0.024)
–0.031 **
(0.015)
0.136 *** 0.135 *** 0.136 ***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
0.083 * 0.083 * 0.083 *
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
0.107 ** 0.106 ** 0.107 **
(0.477) (0.048) (0.048)
–0.050 ** –0.041 ** –0.043 *
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
0.008 0.020 –0.001
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
–0.079 *
(0.046)
–0.099 ***
(0.033)
–0.027
(0.033)
0.030
(0.036)
Control variables
Industry dummy
Year dummy
R2
Sample size
Null hypothesis
36.070 ***
(0.000)
1.180
(0.278)
8.090 ***
(0.005)
40.930 ***
(0.000)
2.890 *
(0.090)
10.440 **
(0.001)
Wald test of differences in model coefficients
Founder management = descendant
management
Founder firm (M&O) = founder firm
(M)
Descendant firm (M&O) = descendant
Firm (M)
Founder firm (M&O) = descendant firm
(M&O)
Founder firm (M) = descendant firm
(M)
Family firm (O) = descendant firm
(M&O)
Yes Yes
Dependent variables: Tobin's q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept
Founder management
Descendant firm (M&O)
Descendant firm (M)
Descendant-in-law firm (M&O)
Descendant-in-law firm (M)
Descendant management
Family  firm (O)
Founder firm (M&O)
Founder firm (M)
3rd generation firm (M&O)
3rd generation firm (M)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
15637 15637 15637 15637
0.348 0.352 0.353 0.352
 
Notes: Upper panel of this table shows the results of OLS regressions with 15,590 firm-year 
observations. The sample consists of the firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Stock 
Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at the end of 1990, with financial firms and public utility 
firms excluded. The sample period is from 1990 to 1998. Firms that have a Tobin’s q below the 1st 
percentile or above the 99th percentile are excluded from regressions. Control variables are related 
firm1, related firm2 and affiliated firm, log of assets, leverage, log of firm age since foundation and 
beta. In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level. The lower 
panel shows the results of wald test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of each family 
firm are the same. In parentheses are P-values. In both panels, *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Alternative Regressions: Tobin’s q and Family Firms 
1.579 *** 1.601 *** 1.490 *** 1.010 *** 2.704 ***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.051) (0.104) (0.386)
1.307 *** 0.137 *** 0.124 *** 0.079 *** -0.008
(0.026) (0.029) (0.012) (0.017) (0.026)
0.096 * 0.103 *** 0.079 *** 0.050 ** 0.001
(0.054) (0.038) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
0.081 ** 0.115 ** 0.059 *** 0.063 *** 0.002
(0.036) (0.047) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027)
–0.036 * –0.037 * –0.043 *** –0.031 ** –0.076 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.025)
-0.001 –0.001 0.010 –0.012 –0.047 ***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Control variables
Industry dummy
Year dummy
R2 (Pseudo-R2)
Sample size
Null hypothesis
0.380 0.600 4.350 ** 1.490 0.110
(0.538) (0.438) (0.037) (0.223) (0.742)
2.360 2.650 20.610 *** 1.330 1.720
(0.125) (0.104) (0.000) (0.248) (0.190)
35.720 *** 32.020 *** 167.550 *** 47.400 *** 13.410 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3.100 * 7.070 *** 10.690 *** 9.040 *** 4.770 **
(0.079) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.029)
9.680 *** 9.380 *** 32.280 *** 24.400 13.940 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wald test of differences in model coefficients
Founder firm (M&O) =
founder firm (M)
Descendant firm (M&O) =
descendant Firm (M)
Founder firm (M&O) =
descendant firm (M&O)
Family firm (O) =
descendant firm (M&O)
Founder firm (M) =
descendant firm (M)
0.216
15950 15637
0.143
15637
0.350
Median
regression
(3)
Random
effect
(4)
Dependent variables: Tobin's q
Yes Yes
YesYesYes
Yes
0.341
Yes
Intercept
Fixed
effect
(5)
Alternative
senior
manager
defenition
(2)
Alternative
family
ownership
definition
(1)
Founder firm (M&O)
Founder firm (M)
Family  firm (O)
Descendant firm (M&O)
Descendant firm (M)
Yes YesYesYes
0.350
1563715637
Yes
No
YesYes
 
Notes: Upper panel of this table shows the results of regressions with 15,590 firm-year observations. The sample 
consists of the firms listed on the First and Second Sections of the Stock Exchanges of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya at 
the end of 1990, with financial firms and public utility firms excluded. The sample period is from 1990 to 1998. 
Firms that have a Tobin’s q below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile are excluded from regressions of 
column (1), (2), (4) and (5). Control variables are related firm1, related firm2 and affiliated firm, log of assets, 
leverage, log of firm age since foundation and beta. In column (1) and (2), OLS regression is used. In column (1), 
founder firm (M&O) is a firm where the senior manager (president or chairman) is the founder, and the founding 
family owns 5% or more of the firm’s equity. Founder firm (M) is a firm where the senior manager is the founder, but 
the founding family owns below 5% of the firm’s equity. Family firm (O) is a firm where the founding family owns 
5% or more of the firm’s equity, but the senior manager is not a family member. Descendant firm (M&O) is a firm 
where the senior manager (president or chairman) is the founder’s descendant after the founder retired, and the 
founding family owns 5% or more of the firm’s equity. Descendant firm (M) is a firm where the senior manager 
(president or chairman) is the founder’s descendant after the founder retired, but the founding family owns below 5% 
of the firm’s equity. In column (2), senior manager is defined as representative directors. Based on this alternative 
senior manager definition, family firm (O), founder firm (M&O), founder firm (M), descendant firm (M&O) and 
descendant firm (M) are constructed. In parentheses are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm 
level in column (1), (2), (4) and (5), and standard errors in column (3). The lower panel shows the results of wald test 
to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of each family firm are the same. In parentheses are P-values. In both 
panels, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Performance Changes around Transitions of Family Firms 
Transition Sample size
From founder firm (M&O)
         to descendant firm (M&O) –0.107 ** –0.046 * 55
From founder firm (M&O)
         to family firm (O) 0.163 0.118 25
Difference –0.270 ** –0.164 *
From founder firm (M)
         to descendant firm (M) –0.047 –0.085 34
From founder firm (M)
         to nonfamily firm –0.186 –0.039 14
Difference 0.139 –0.047
From 2nd generation firm (M&O)
         to 3rd generation firm (M&O) –0.045 0.038 30
From 2nd generation firm (M&O)
         to family firm (O) –0.018 –0.027 23
Difference –0.026 0.065
From 2nd generation firm (M)
         to 3rd generation firm (M) –0.058 –0.020 12
From 2nd generation firm (M)
         to nonfamily firm –0.036 –0.023 45
Difference –0.021 0.004
Change in industry-adjusted Tobin's q
Mean Median
 
Notes: This table shows the change in industry-adjusted Tobin’s q around transitions of 
family firms. Change in industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is defined as industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s q at two-years after the transition minus industry-adjusted Tobin’s q at 
two-years before the transition. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is defined as Tobin's q 
minus industry median Tobin's q. *, **, and *** indicate significantly different from 
zero at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Treatment Regressions: Tobin's q and Family Firms 
Treatment dummy =
1.174 *** 0.759 *** 1.062 *** 0.922 *** 1.203 *** 0.920 ***
(0.096) (0.108) (0.111) (0.109) (0.104) (0.098)
0.328 *** 0.388 *** 0.412 *** 0.395 *** –0.342 *** 0.294 ***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013)
0.003 –0.007 –0.023 * –0.014 –0.022 ** 0.002
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
–0.014 * –0.036 ** -0.061 *** -0.053 *** –0.043 *** –0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011)
–0.024 ** –0.056 *** -0.068 *** -0.044 *** –0.044 *** –0.019
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015)
0.006 –0.003 –0.012 ** –0.007 –0.016 *** –0.010 *
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
–0.0001 –0.0003 0.00002 –0.0001 0.00025 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
–0.009 –0.006 –0.027 –0.021 –0.026 *** –0.015 *
(0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
0.026 * 0.007 –0.018 –0.013 –0.044 ** –0.021
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Industry dummy
Year dummy
Treatment equation
0.534 * –0.234 –0.608 *** –0.845 * 1.078 *** –0.969 ***
(0.295) (0.416) (0.547) (0.478) (0.365) (0.313)
2.702 *** 2.870 *** 3.016 *** 2.922 *** –2.759 *** 2.957 ***
(0.054) (0.075) (0.087) (0.099) (0.071) (0.075)
–0.009 *** –0.017 *** –0.028 *** –0.007 –0.009 *** -0.005
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
–0.374 0.498 0.620 0.558 –0.810 *** 0.637 **
(0.232) (0.443) (0.843) (0.434) (0.381) (0.311)
–0.020 0.013 0.004 0.019 –0.067 *** 0.024
(0.017) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) (0.018)
0.001 0.001 –0.001 –0.0004 0.002 –0.0007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.0014)
–0.091 *** –0.196 *** –0.105 *** –0.069 *** –0.014 0.001
(0.015) (0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
–0.116 ** –0.044 0.038 –0.060 –0.154 *** 0.014
(0.048) (0.062) (0.079) (0.104) (0.055) (0.059)
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald chi-sq
Sample size
(5) (6)
Yes Yes
–4525.12 –3718.81
22064.07 10177.98
–3739.16
Beta
15637
Yes Yes
11171 10211
Yes
11936 11460
Log of assets
2952.97
Leverage
Log of firm age
since foundation
–6830.91
Idiosyncratic risk
991.54
Log of assets
Yes Yes
–2852.04 –3031.19
368.25 534.49
Log of firm age
since IPO
Number of
negative profit
Beta
10278
Yes Yes
Intercept
Related firm1
Leverage
Affiliated firm
Indutry-adjusted
Tobin's q
Yes
Family firm
Founder firm
(M&O)
Intercept
Treatment dummy
Yes
Related firm2
Yes
Descendant
firm (M&O)
Descendant
firm (M)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Founder firm
(M)
Family firm
(O)
 
Notes: This table shows the results of treatment regressions. The upper panel includes 
the results from the outcome equation and the lower panel contains the estimates for the 
treatment equation. The treatment group is a dummy that equals one for family firms as 
a whole or for one of the five types of family firms. The outcome variable is Tobin’s q. 
Sample firms are comprised of only the family firm in the category analyzed and 
nonfamily firms. Number of negative profit and idiosyncratic risk are used as the 
exogenous variable in the treatment equation model. Number of negative profit is the 
number of times before-tax after-interest profit is negative after an IPO. In parentheses 
are robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Transition of Family Firms 
This figure shows the transitions of family firms from 1990 to 1994 and from 1994 to 1998. Transitions below three cases are 
abbreviated for viewability. 
 
1990 1994 1998
Founder firm (M&O) Founder firm (M&O) Founder firm (M&O)
197 153 110
Founder firm (M) Founder firm (M) Founder firm (M)
59 39 16
2nd generation firm (M&O) 2nd generation firm (M&O) 2nd generation firm (M&O)
175 176 167
2nd generation firm (M) 2nd generation firm (M) 2nd generation firm (M)
119 120 122
3rd generation firm (M&O) 3rd generation firm (M&O) 3rd generation firm (M&O)
51 66 76
3rd generation firm (M) 3rd generation firm (M) 3rd generation firm (M)
58 66 65
Family  firm (O) Family  firm (O) Family  firm (O)
38 52 57
Nonfamily firm Nonfamily firm Nonfamily firm
1121 1130 1138
Delisting Delisting
24 43
152 105
6
2313
26
98
32
176
14
157
141
7
1510
6
134
9
14
7
89
7
19
4 95
5
15
45
5
57
48
7
4
52
9
6
6
26
5
37
9
22
4
1089
34
5
1088
 
